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MILITARY JUSTICE
A REINFORCER OF DISCIPLINE
Robert S. Poydasheff
The American involvement in Vietnam generated intense soul-searching,
questioning, and argument among various segments of American society. In
particular, the My Lai cases and other
incidents focused public attention upon
the existing system of military criminal
law. 1 Many Americans, having little or
no professional contact with the Armed
Forces, were exposed to highly misleading and inaccurate generalizations
and conceptualizations concerning a
system that "is now a sophisticated
system of justice.,,2 The military justice
system must enjoy public confidence
and understanding, because "a system
of justice is merely as good as the public
believes it to be.,,3 There is little, if any,
value in the system if it is not trusted or
understood by the American public.

Unfortunately, some observers
wrongly perceive the military justice
system as a system remote from American military ethical considerations,
having no nexus to justice. They see it
as one operating to the prejudice of the
accused by failing to accord him the
procedural and substantive protections
of the judicial process under the Constitution and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 4 One writer has
even erroneously asserted that: "None
of the travesties of justice perpetuated
under the UCMJ is really very surprising
for military law has always been and
continues to be primarily an instrument
of discipline, not justice."s
The Uniform Code of Military Justice does not reflect a congressional
desire to enforce discipline to the detri-
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ment of American notions of justice.
Rather, it combines most of the judicial
concepts relating to individual rights 7 in
a code of conduct, the violation of
which is proscribed and which reflects
the military ethic. While the soldier, by
joining the military, subjects himself to
the limitation or curtailment of the
scope of his basic freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech), he surrenders none of
them. The military member continues
to enjoy all of the basic rights and
freedoms he enjoyed in civilian life.
However, he or she must exercise these
rights in a manner consistent with the
overriding interests of the military.
There was a time when joining the
military meant the surrender of certain
righ ts. This is no longer true. In order to
highlight the role of law in a military
environment, it is necessary to discuss
the meaning of the military ethic, certain codal articles 8 as they implement
the ethic, and some of the basic rights
of an accused under military law.

THE MILITARY ETHIC
The military ethic is not a "theory"
of military conduct. It is a code of
behavior pertaining to a profession-the
profession of arms. This code is consistent with the American tradition. It is
empirically derived, and by its nature it
is noncompulsory. Being noncompulsory, we should not be surprised that
not all the members of American Armed
Forces adhere to it at any given moment. In order to demand this adherence, the Congress enacted a Uniform Code of Military Justice-criminal
laws-in an attempt to corporealize the
ethic into concrete statutes, violations
of which could lead to penal sanctions.
In so doing, the Congress provided in
the broadest sense the nexus between
the military ethic and justice.
The term "military ethic" is rather
amorphous when viewed in the abstract.
Indeed, in attempting to define the term

precisely, one generally thinks of "duty,
honor, country," "loyalty," and "mission and men." There are many, no
doubt, who would view the ethical
conceptions of the American military
forces as anachronistic. Nevertheless,
" ... it is in fact the very essence of
military professionalism.,,9 Today, the
line between the military services,
especially the Army, and civilian society
has become blurred with the mobilization of thousands of citizens into uniformed citizen-soldiers. As a result, the
possibilities exist that" ... the patterns
of military authority [may] shift from
authoritarian command to organizational decisionmaking.,,1 0 Under these
conditions, the concepts embodied in
the military ethic must be reinforced in
order to insure adherence to standards
which are still both viable and necessary
in the American Armed Forces.
The Armed Forces constitute a
unique and specialized society because
their ultimate function is that of combat in the national defense. For this
reason, military forces are separate and
distinct in many aspects from the parent
civilian society. They have developed
their own traditions which have given
rise to the military ethic, which, in tum,
is based on a recognition that the
purpose of our military forces is to fight
wars, or to be ready to fight them,
should the occasion arise. 1 1 The
soldier's first duty is the accomplishment of his mission, and his second is to
insure the welfare of his men. If this
were not the basic principle, "any military operation involving a risk would
not be undertaken, and in fact the
military forces could be dispensed
with.,,12
The military ethic consists of a code
of behavior appropriate for an organization whose primary purpose is to fight if
called upon to do so. Its practical effect
is to provide or to account for the
motives underlying military conduct. 13
Writers such as Ward Just fail to consider the military ethic as a system of
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empirical norms which provides the
guideposts for proper military conduct.
He has opined that "the army has been
corporatized. It has become something
of a syndicate, a corporate state with its
own laws and traditions and proceedings." Quite to the contrary, the
military ethic, by regarding love of
country, duty, honor, et cetera, as
virtuous and by emphasizing them continuously, has enabled the Army to
avoid succumbing to corporatization.
For example, the military ethic requires
the American Army to "maintain a
nonpartisan posture, i.e., a nonparty
affiliation. ,,14 Yet we have had obvious
cases of members of the Army who
openly and notoriously advocated particularistic political philosophy. 1 5 An
extreme example is found in the case of
Parker v. Levy, 1 6 where Army Captain
Levy, stationed at Fort Jackson, declared he would not obey a written
order to conduct training. In addition,
he made several public statements to
enlisted personnel indicating that the
United States was wrong in being involved in the Vietnam war and that
"Colored soldiers" should disobey
orders to go to Vietnam.
Even though the military ethic proscribes formal, public political advocacy, members of the military profession may hold political beliefs, show
political preference, and vote in elections. One authority goes so far as to
main tain that "Military personnel
should be permitted to serve on local
school boards, run in nonpartisan local
elections, and be members of government advisory boards and public panels
where they have qualifications and interests.,,1 7
Thus, the norms of "duty, honor,
country," "loyalty," and "mission and
men" provide the parameters as to how
soldiers ought to behave.
When viewed from the perspective of
a lawyer, these norms are seen to
underlie the concept of discipline,
which "is the very soul of Armies-

difficult to acquire but capable of being
lost immediately. There can be no disruption lest the armed forces disintegrate into a mere armed mob amid the
stresses of peacetime hardship and war
time fear."IS This approach emphasizes
that the end or purpose of a soldier's
action is to obey and not to deliberate. 19

MILITARY LAW
Military criminal law is concerned
with many concepts that are not necessarily embraced within the character of
the military ethic. Within the military
legal framework the independence ·of
the courts-martial 20 from command influence, the independence of the Court
of Military Review2 1 and the Court of
Military Appeals, as well as the traditional limitation of their scope in
making new law, are excellent examples
of the separation of judicial and military
ethical values in the military law. 2 2 Of
all the ethical values encompassed in
military law,· the chief one is the main. tenance of a disciplined force, which
military law in tum reinforces.
As discipline must be maintained
within the military, so breaches of
discipline must be punished. Any breach
of the military ethic-discipline could
impair the fighting effectiveness of a
military unit. Any infraction which
would lessen a soldier's enthusiasm to
respond to duty would necessarily
impair the effectiveness of his unit.
Should that unit be in combat, any
reluctance, however slight, to respond
to duty "could be disastrous, or even
fatal. ,,23
Certain aspects of this ethic, embodied in the concept of discipline, are
peculiar to the Armed Forces. Three
articles of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice illustrate the importance of law
in reinforcing the military ethic. The
first is article 88,24 which prohibits
commissioned officers from using "contemptuous words" against the President,
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Vice President, Congress, and other high
civil officials. If convicted, an offender
"shall be punished as the court-martial
may direct."
The others are article 92, prohibiting
disobedience to orders, 2 5 and article
134, 2 6 the so-called general article,
which punishes, inter alia, "[A] 11
disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the
armed forces," not otherwise specifically mentioned in the UCMJ.
Article 88-Contemptuous Words.
During the recently ended Vietnam era,
a small but vocal group of servicemen
emerged within the Military Establishment. They expressed in no uncertain
terms their opposition to the war and
the role of the United States in it. The
case of 2d Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr., 2 7 is
a classic example of a violation of
professional ethics which resulted in
judicial sanctions because the law, in .
this instance, reinforced the ethic.
Howe, an Ordnance Corps officer in the
Army Reserve, was serving on active
duty at Fort Bliss, Tex. While there, he
marched with demonstrating civilians in
downtown El Paso, Tex., condemning
the Vietnam war. Howe carried a placard indicating that the late President
Johnson was a Fascist who was conducting an illegal war. In addition to
being charged with using contemptuous
words against President Johnson, Howe
was charged with conduct unbecoming
an "officer and gentleman 28 and promoting disloyalty and disaffection
among the troops and civilian populace
to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline. 29 He appeared
before a general court-martial, was convicted, and sentenced to dismissal,3 0
forfeiture bf all pay and allowances, and
confinement at hard labor for 2 years.
The confinement was reduced to 1 year
by the convening authority, and the
sentence was eventually affirmed by the
United States Court of Military Appeals.
After serving approximately 3 months

of his sentence, Howe was granted a
parole.
Should Howe have been tried? Is not
an American entitled to criticize his
government as provided for and protected by the Constitution?31 Howe was
the first person to have been prosecuted
under article 88 of the 1950 UCMJ. The
restrictions of this article embrace not
only loyalty, one of the fundamentals
of the military ethic, 32 but also the
prenrlse that the American Armed
Forces are subordinate to duly constituted civilian authority. After all, under
the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, a
point overlooked by some of Howe's
defenders.
Limitation of this proscription to
officers has been questioned, 33 and
during World Wars I and II courtsmartial for such an offense were infrequent. In cases where commanders
did bring servicemen to trial for their
remarks, courts would acquit if the
remarks were casual statements made
"in private conversations and political
discussions. 1134 Howe's case was far
different than the cases of servicemen
expressing contempt in private at the
apex of duly constituted authority. He
flagrantly and publicly abused his position and in so doing invit~d contentiousness among other personnel at Fort
Bliss. Such "concerted political proselytizing in an attempt to cause general
disaffection toward the President [was]
rare. 113 5 Nevertheless, the military ethic
demands that civil authority be protected against threats from those who
are in military power, and if effect is to
be given to this principle, then there
must exist a legal proscription, the
violation of which may be punished.
No doubt restricting the speech of
military members invites constitutional
attack, and article 88 has been criticized
on this ground. 3 6 Even though members of the Armed Forces do retain
certain basic rights, 3 7 the military "constitutes a specialized community
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governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian.,,3 8 If the military
ethic were to deny this distinction by
removing the restrictions embraced in
article 88, it would not only create
"new forms of tension,,3 9 but might
start the process of seriously eroding
respect for and the sanctity of authority. The United States Supreme
Court appears to reinforce this view. In
Parker v. Levy, the court said:
While members of the military
community enjoy many of the
same rights and bear many of the
same burdens as do members of
the civilian community, within
the military community, there is
simply not the same autonomy as
there is in the larger civilian community. The military establishment is subject to the control of
the civilian commander-inchief.... 40
In this case, the majority of the
Supreme Court limited the constitutional
right of free speech as it applies to
servicemen. The Supreme Court is beginning a process of defining constitutional areas which would not be open to
the military community, because of the
uniqueness of that community and because of the importance of preserving the
superior-subordinate relationship. This
limitation which was implicitly recognized in Levy particularly applies to
Howe because more was involved in that
case. True, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Military Establishment and, as such, he was Howe's superior in the chain of command. Howe's
conviction could be sustained on that
issue alone. The major premise underlying article 88 is to reinforce that portion
of the military ethic which emphatically
accepts civilian control of the military.
Thus, if the Howe case had been argued
before the Supreme Court, it is unlikely
that the Court would have accepted the
view that all of the rights and privileges
guaranteed by the first amendment to all
persons, especially in the political arena,

apply in a military context. Indeed, at
"the time the Bill of Rights was adopted,
little if any thought was given to whether
those provisions had direct relevance to
the military context, and courts-martial
from the beginning assumed they did
not. ,,41 Further, some authorities consider the military as an "alien sector" of
American society which "fall[s] outside
the area in which ... freedom of expression must be maintained.,,42 It is
"alien," of course, because there is a
separate ethic for the military society.
To someone who does not appreciate
the difference between civil and military
society, there is an inconsistency between the military ethic (and military
attitudes) and the civilian values embodied in the first amendment. 43 There
are three ways to view the relationship
of the military ethic to first amendment
values: (1) the first amendment right to
free speech does not apply to the
military, (2) the protections apply fully,
without any restrictions,44 and (3)
there are compatible areas permitting a
convergence of civilian notions of free
speech to be applied so long as no
violation of the military ethic occurs,
which is serious enou~h to erode discipline. 4 5 I subscribe to this latter view.
The Howe case acutely highlighted this
relationship. It is unlikely that the
Supreme Court would conclude that
first amendment coverage is irrelevant
to servicemen and that only Congress
can legislate the scope of constitutional
application to the military. Congressional power concerning the military is
not free from judicial scrutiny.46 In our
society the relationship between the
military and the rest of society with
respect to political actions is not
ambiguous, so long as there is a judicially reinforced ethic guiding the
actions of military personnel. Of course,
"the fact that a man is a member of the
armed forces, and therefore in some
situations a servant to the state and its
commanders, does not obliterate the
fact that as a citizen he has certain
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rights which remain.,,47 But, on balance, article 88 is an example of the
military ethic judicially enforced on the
military segment of society.48
Article 92-Failure to Obey Lawful
Orders. The paramount article of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice which
highlights and enforces the heart of the
military ethic is article 92:
Any person subject to this chapter
who (1) violates or fails to obey
any lawful general order or regulation; (2) having knowledge of any
other lawful order issued by a
member of the armed forces,
which it is his duty to obey, fails
to obey the order; or (3) is
derelict in the performance of his
duties; shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct. 4 9
Obedience to orders is the sine qua
non to discipline; and without discipline
all aspects of the military ethic fail. To a
military lawyer, the military ethic and
its conceptual underpinnings are embodied in the term "discipline." Field
Marshall Slim has stated the necessity
for discipline in a military organization:
The more modem war becomes,
the more essential appear the
basic qualities that from the beginnings of history have distinguished armies from mobs. The
first of these is discipline. We very
soon learned in Burma that strict
discipline in battle and in bivouac
was vital, not only for success, but
for survival. Nothing is easier in
jungle or dispersed fighting than
for a man to shirk. If he has no
stomach for advancing, all he has
to do is to flop into the undergrowth; in retreat, he can slink
out of the rear guard, join up
later, and swear he was the last to
leave. A patrol leader can take his
men a mile into the jungle, hide
there and return with any report
he fancies. Only discipline ... can
stop that sort of thing; the real

discipline that a man holds to
because it is a refusal to betray his
comrades. The discipline that
makes a sentry, whose whole
body is tortured for sleep, rest his
chin on the point of his bayonet
because he knows, if he nods, he
risks the lives of the men sleeping
behind him ... at some stage in
all wars, armies have let their
discipline sag, but they have never
won victory until they made it
taut again; nor will they. 5 0
The concept of obedience underlies
discipline. A failure to obey a lawful
command could easily jeopardize the
lives of men, the success of a mission,
and, if widespread, the organization
itself. The purpose of article 92 is quite
clear. Men and women recruited from
the wide spectrum of American society
must be taught to obey the orders of
their superiors. In the heat of combat or
even in a hostile environment, ordinary
sanctions and exhortations may be
neither sufficient nor effective to
enforce the military value system on the
members of the organization. It is only
through long years of training and
associations with comrades and units
that service members learn to overcome,
to varying degrees, their natural instincts of self-preservation. The preservation of all requires the obedience of
all. For these reasons, the law requires
that.all members of the military society
shall obey lawful commands.
As a general rule, military men and
women have a legal duty to obey, and
they may be punished if they do not.
Article 92 contains an important qualification: the order must be lawful. The
problem is that, when a soldier is
confronted with an [illegal] order
to perform an act constituting a
criminal offense, the demands of
military discipline, as expressed in
the duty of obedience to superior
orders, come into conflict with
the imperative need to preserve
the supremacy of the law as
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manifested in the prescriptions of
criminal law: military discipline
requires unflinching compliance
with orders; the supremacy of the
law proscribes the commission of
criminal acts. 5 1
The requirement to obey only lawful
orders at first seems to present a conflict between the values of the military
ethic and the values of American society
as reflected in the concept of "Rule of
Law." In addition to a philosophical
problem, there is also a practical one: if
someone obeys an illegal order and thus
commits a criminal act, he violates other
provisions of the UCMJ and may be
tried and punished for them. If, on the
other hand, he does not obey, he risks
being punished "for the violation of
article 92. Further,
... the horns of the dilemma are
sharp and strong enough to
wangle the entire legal system
insofar as its theory is concerned:
if a soldier commits an offence in
obedience to superior orders, and
is, therefore, criminally indicted,
or, alternatively, if he refuses to
comply with an order to perform
an act constituting an offence and
is consequently charged before a
court-martial-will he be convicted or acquitted? If he is
convicted anyhow, whether he
commits the criminal act as
ordered or refrains from doing so,
the legal system seems to be
tainted by an iniquitous inconsistency that is all but incredible. And if the soldier is to
incur criminal responsibility for
his act only in one of the two
cases and not in the other, certain
difficulties emerge. On the one
hand if the soldier risks his life in
disobeying superior orders and
refusing to carry out the criminal
act, whereas he is exculpated
when the offence is committed by
him in compliance with the
orders-this solution may incite

the commission of crimes and
bring about a public outcry.... 52
Nowhere was this problem more
highlighted in American military law
than in the My Lai cases, which produced a massive outpouring of hyperbole and hurled invectives by an
aroused public. These cases arose out
of a particularly deplorable act on
the part of former 1st Lt. William L.
Calley and others during operations in
the subhamIet of My Lai (4) in Song
My village, Quang Ngai Province,
Republic of South Vietnam, on 16
March 1968. The cases concerned
Calley and some of his troops who
did the actual shootings and those
who "covered up" the incident. There
were many who charged that if the
perpetrators were not punished (all
notions of criminal justice appeared
to vanish) then the soldiers would
literally be getting away with murder.
Others asserted that if the soldiers
were obeying. orders and if they were
punished, then all other military men
could defy orders with impunity
thereby breaking down good order
and military discipline.
Not one writer appears to have
indicated an awareness of American
military law in this area or that the
"dilemma" between the law and the
military ethic had already been reconciled as far as U.S. military forces are
concerned. It is submitted that the
My Lai cases, posing the problem
they did, were properly and correctly
resolved by the U.S. Army.
At the time the act was committed, 1st Lt. William L. Calley commanded a platoon in C Company, 1st
Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Light
Infantry Brigade, in Vietnam. The
brigade was a part of the America
Division which was assigned a tactical
area of operations along tpe South
China Sea from Quant Ngai Province
north into Quang Nan Province. Each
brigade (there were three) had its

433
own operations area; that of the 11th
Brigade ran from the Duc Pho District
north to Binh Son and inland approximately 30 kilometers. s 3 Sometime in
January 1968, Calley's organization was
assigned to a composite force known as
Task Force Barker. This organization
was assigned an area of operations
known as Muscatine. 'The units of Task
Force Barker drew fire from enemy
forces in the Muscatine area which
would then withdraw south. After the
Tet offensive in February 1%8, Task
Force Barker extended its operations
southward, enbracing the Son My village, because intelligence reports had
indicated that the 48th Vietcong Battalion had its base in the My Lai area of
Song My. Sweeps into the area by the
Task Force were only moderately successful. Although Calley's unit had not
experienced much combat prior to 16
March 1%8, it did sustain casualties
from mines and booby traps.
On 15 March 1%8, Captain Medina,
the commander of Calley's company,
was notified that the company would be
involved in an offensive action in the
My Lai area the following day. Medina
briefed his company that evening about
the area, the mission, resistance to be
expected from the 48th VC Battalion,
and other pertinent matters. Calley
argued later that Medina ordered him
and others to "waste them," referring to
the villagers. 5 4 Nevertheless, the company engaged in the My Lai operations
on the 16th of March without receiving
any fire. No mines or booby traps were
detonated, and the only unit casualty
on that day was a self-inflicted wound.
In the My Lai (4) area only unwarned,
unresisting, and frightened old men,
women, and children were encountered
-no enemy units. Yet, the evidence
conclusively showed that Calley and
some members of his platoon, at his
urging, shot villagers and herded others
into a ditch on the eastern boundary of
My Lai (4) and murdered them. s 5
CalleyS 6 was tried and convicted by

a general court-martial held at Fort
Benning, Ga., of three specifications of
premeditated murder and one of assault
with intent to murder in violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. He
was sentenced on 31 March 1971 to
dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and confinement at hard
labor for life. 'The general court-martial
convening authority, in his review of the
case, approved the dismissal and the
forfeitures, but he reduced the confinement portion of the sentence to 20
years. Calley appealed his conviction on
grounds alleging numerous irregularities
occurring at and during the trial. 'The
issues raised by Calley were resolved
against him by the Army Court of
Military Review; that opinion was sustained by the United States Court of
Military Appeals.
'The significant point here is that
among the arguments of extraordinary
scope employed by Calley's attorneys,
one factor directly highlighted the
apparent conflict between the military
ethic of obedience to orders and the law
proscribing murder. Assuming arguendo,
that an order was received by Calley to
"waste" everybody in My Lai, was he
justified in heeding such an order?
Indeed, is there a basic onflict at all
between civilian notions of legality and
the obedience to orders?
'The villagers had a right to life, and
any order to kill them, so long as they
were noncombatants and not belligerents, was patently illegal. 'The fact
that the inhabitants of My Lai sympathized with the Vietcong is not important so long as they were not at the
time of the Muscatine operation engaging in hostile actions against Calley's
platoon. Even if some of the villagers
had previously engaged in hostile operations, the wanton killing of the villagers
in response to the "presumed delicts of
a few is not a lawful response to the
delicts. ,,57 Further, reprisal, if indeed
this was Calley's intent, by "summary
execution of the helpless is forbidden in
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the laws of land warfare"s 8 which are a
part of the laws governing the American
Armed Forces and have been for numerous years. S 9 Thus, there can be no
question that any orders to execute
summarily innocent civilians or those
eligible for prisoner-of-war status are
illegal violations of American military
law. Such orders are not within the
orbit of article 92. 6 0
The fact that Calley alleged that he
was ordered to do what he did raises the
question of whether he could defend his
action by asserting that, ethically,
obedience of superior orders was demanded of him. Obedience to an unlawful order is not a defense in the trial
of any accused unless he did not know,
and could not reasonably have been
expected to know, that the order was
unlawful. 6 1 Realizing that this issue
could become one that is difficult to
resolve, given the dynamics of combat
and the ethical norm demanding obedience, the Army specifically permits the
determination of legality to be made by
courts-martial. Field Manual 27-10, The
Law of Land Warfare states:
b. In considering the question
whether a superior order constitutes a valid defense, the court
shall take into consideration the
fact that obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of every
member of the armed forces; that
the latter cannot be expected, in
conditions of war discipline, to
weigh scrupulously the legal
merits of the orders received; that
certain rules of warfare may be
done in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of reprisal. At
the same time it must be borne in
mind that members of the armed
forces are bound to obey only
lawful orders. 6 2
In combat situations great difficulty
can arise in determining the legality of
an order. Therefore, permitting a courtmartial to consider all of the attendant
circumstances, to view the accused in a

light favorable to him, and to demand
that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is a proper and a practical
way of reconciling the law and the
ethic. 63
The military ethic is also reconciled
with civilian notions of justice because
orders are presumed to be valid, and
an accused who disobeys an order has
the burden of proving illegality.64 If a
soldier believes that the order is
ambiguous, he is obliged to seek
clarification from the superior who
issued the order. If the order is illegal,
then he "must try to have the order
rescinded, disregard the order if the
superior persists, and also report the
incident to higher headquarters or an
alternative source.,,6 5 There was no
evidence anywhere in the Calley case
that he questioned the presumed order
of Captain Medina, assuming, as the
author emphatically does not, that the
order could be considered valid. Yet,
Calley should have known that killing
unarmed, unresisting men, women, and
children was illegal. Neither the military ethic nor the law requires that
soldiers act as automatons in obeying
orders. American servicemembers are
expected to respond to orders as
persons imbued with our basic societal
values (taught them in our military and
civilian schools, the home, and the
church). The military court took this
into account in reaching its determination and found Calley's action as
an officer woefully wanting. As the
Court of Military Review stated:
We find no impediment to the
fmdings that appellant acted with
murderous mens rea, including
premeditation. The aggregate of
all his contentions against the
existence of murderous mens rea
is no more absolving than a bare
claim that he did not suspect he
did any wrong act until after the
operation, and indeed is not convinced of it yet. This is no excuse
in law. 66
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Such a reconciliation of law and
military ethic will not breed insubordination, because the servicemember is
bound only to refuse patently illegal
orders or those that he personally
knows are illegal. In cases where legality
is blurred, "the responsibility rests with
the superior giving the order, not the
subordinate who obeys it-he can presume legality until an obviously illegal
order arises.,,6 7 Therefore, in such cases
the defense of superior orders would be
a legitimate defense for the lower ranks
who, in obeying illegal orders, could
contend that they did not know or
could not have known the orders were
illegal. They are, as a result, ultimately
protected by the law.

Article 134-The General Article.
The fin~ UCMJ article to be discussed is
article 134, which is known as the
"general" or "catchall" article. This
article is similar in nature to article 133,
which proscribes conduct that is unbecoming to officers, obviously an
attempt to set higher standards for the
officer corps than for the other ranks.
Article 134 exists to punish offenses not
specifically denounced elsewhere in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. It is a
primary source for the enforcement of
the military ethic and, as such, it is a
unique tool to maintain and strengthen
discipline. The law embodied in article
134 does not make "every irregular,
mischievous, or improper act a Courtmartial offense.,,6 8 Rather, it is limited
to conduct that is "directly and palpably ... prejudicial to good order and
discipline.,,69
Critics have assailed this provision
and its officer counterpart because, they
say, there is unpredictability as to what
actions are punishable. The critics claim
there appear to be no objective standards other than a list of specifically
denounced offenses, and thus the determination of what offenses are "prejudicial to good order and discipline"
are ultimately within the judgment of

an officer imposing punishment or convening a court. This aspect of unpredictability would certainly appear to be true
in those cases where a breach of a
custom of the service is charged as an
offense. The Manual for Courts-Martial
states that:
A breach of a custom of the
service may result in a violation of
this clause of Article 134. In its
legal sense of the word "custom"
imports something more than a
method of procedure or a mode
of conduct or behavior which is
merely of frequent or usual occurrence. Custom arises out of long
established practices which by
common consent have attained
the force of law in the military.... A custom which has not
been adopted by existing statute
or regulation ceases to exist when
its observance has been long
abandoned 70
There appears to be a superficial
justification for the criticism leveled at
this codal attempt to enforce traditionally well-known and accepted standards. 71 But close analysis indicates that
civilian standards which require criminal
statutes to be defmite and certain and
to provide for predictability have been
met by the filling-in done by the Court
of Military Review and the Court of
Military Appeals as well as the guides
contained in the appendix to the
Manual for Courts-Martial. In this
manner, terms such as "customs" or
"Conduct of a nature to bring discredit
on the armed forces" have been continuously defined and refmed by these
courts in no less a manner than "fundamental rights" and "due process" have
been defined and given substance by the
United States Supreme Court. 72
Further, if a member of the military
service is charged with a particular
violation of a custom or ethic, his
actions must also be shown to be
prejudicial to good order and discipline
or to bring discredit to his service. In
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this regard, the military courts and
commanders are always influenced by
such factors as time, location, nature of
offense, and all of the circumstances
surrounding its commission.
In two recent cases the constitutionality of these articles was considered
in the light of contemporary civilian
standards, and in both cases the courts
recognized the special nature of the
military in assessing its needs for laws
which implement and enforce the military ethic. The case of United States v.
Priest 73 concerned an enlisted man in
the Navy who, while on active duty,
edited, published, and distributed an
underground newspaper. As a result of
these activities, he was convicted of two
specifications concerning the publication and distribution of two issues of his
publication with intent to promote disloyalty and disaffection among members of the Armed Forces. These two
issues, in their entirety, contained statements disloyal to the United States. The
Court of Military Appeals found that
the pamphlets were not only a call to
action but, in fact, suggested means by
which the troops might actively demonstrate their own disloyalty and defection, for example, by deserting, by
demonstrating in public, and by refusing
promotions. The Court found this type
of activity prejudicial to good order and
military discipline, stating:
In the armed forces some restrictions exist for reasons that have
no counterpart in the civilian
community. Disrespectful and
contemptuous speech, even
advocacy of violent change, is
tolerable in the civilian community, for it does not directly
affect the capacity of the Government to discharge its responsibilities unless it both is directed to
inciting imminent lawless action
and is likely to produce action .... In military life, however,
other considerations must be
weighed. The armed forces

depend. on a command structure
that at times must commit men to
combat, not only hazarding their
lives but ultimately involving the
security of the Nation itself.
Speech that is protected in the
civil population may nonetheless
undermine the effectiveness of
response to command. If it does,
it is consti tu tionally unprotected. 74
Finally, in the landmark case of
Capt. Howard Levy,75 the United
States Supreme Court recognized the
uniqueness of the military society. Levy
was an Army officer and a physician
who refused to obey orders to train
Special Forces. He made public statements urging black enlisted men not to
go to Vietnam if ordered to do so, and
he characterized Special Forces personnel as liars, thieves, killers of peasants, and murderers of women and
children. Levy was convicted by a
general court-martial, among other
things, of conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman and for disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline of the Armed
Forces. He then filed a Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Federal District Court
which denied him relief. However, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court, holding that articles
133 and 134 were void because of
vagueness and thereby it applied civilian
concepts of due process to the military
sphere. The case was heard by the
Supreme Court with Justice Rehnquist
writing the majority view of five members. The Court opined that because of
the differentiations between military
society and the civilian society, Congress was permitted to legislate with
greater breadth and flexibility when
prescribing rules governing the military.
Further, neither articles 133 nor 134 of
the UCMJ were void for vagueness
under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment since each article has been
construed by military authorities in a
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manner which narrowed their broad
scope and because considerable specificity had been supplied, by way of
examples, over many years. The Supreme Court indicated that Levy could
have had no reasonable doubt that his
public statements urging black enlisted
men not to go to Vietnam if ordered to
do so were punishable. The Court, in
effect, recognized that in order to foster
orderly and dutiful fighting forces, leeway must be granted to incorporate
basic ethical considerations in a criminal
statute. The Supreme Court stated that:
II • • • to maintain the discipline essential
to perform its mission effectively, the
military has developed what 'may not
unfitly be called the customary military
law' or general usage of the military
service. ,,7 6
The Supreme Court specifically
recognized that both the fundamental
necessity for obedience and the consequent necessity to impose and to maintain discipline permits some actions
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside a military organization.
The Levy case is the best and most
recent example of the recognition of the
viability of the military ethic in contemporary society and its enforcement
by the use of judicial sanctions.

RIGHTS OF MEMBERS
IN THE ARMED SERVICES
What has gone before is not to
suggest in the least that the military
judicial system is void of judicial considerations in protecting servicemembers
who have violated the UCMJ. Indeed,
civilian influence has been extraordinary
in the area of individual rights concerning military accused. In many cases
the individual servicemember has enjoyed greater protection than his civilian
counterpart. For example, the military
criminal legal system demands that free
counsel be provided all accused not only
during interrogation 77 but also during
pretrial" stages. 7 8 Further, in one of the

most frequently discussed areas of
criminal law, that of confessions, the
military legal system, since 1951, has
provided most of the rights enunciated
in Miranda v. Arizona,79 a 1966 case
hailed as a landmark in civil rights. The
Miranda decision, the leading case regarding the privilege against selfincrimination during custodial interrogation, held that unless a defendant was
advised of his right to remain silent, that
any statement made may be used
against him, and that he has the right to
be represented by an attorney, the
prosecutor may not use any of his
statements, exculpatory or inculpatory,
during the trial.
The military legal system has long
required that persons in the military
may not interrogate a suspected or
accused party without first informing
him of the rights stated in the Miranda
decision. In addition, "military law already provided that the suspect or
accused could consult the legal advisor
to the court-martial authority, a lawyer
or his staff, or counsel of his own choice
before being subjected to interrogation, ,,80 and this right was formally
recognized and given juridical effect in
United States v. Tempia,81 a 1967 case
decided by the Court of Military Appeals. Thereafter, all members of the
uniformed services were to be afforded
the protections announced by the
Supreme Court in Miranda. As the
Court stated:
Now, the accused must have a
lawyer; before, he need not have
been given one; now, he must be
warned of his right to counsel;
before, he need not be so warned;
and now, finally, he will receive
effective legal advice not only as
to what he can do, but also as to
what he should do. 8 2
Thus, members of the military have a
twofold protection: the specific warning
requirements afforded under article 31
and the general fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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Members of the armed services have
also been afforded protection from arbitrary referral of charges to general
courts-martial. Congress has provided
that before a criminal charge may be
referred" to a trial by a general court, an
officer must be appointed to investigate
the charges thoroughly and to recommend formally the disposition of the
case to the convening authority.83 In
this article 32 investigation, the investigating officer must impartially and
judiciously determine whether the evidence warrants criminal disposition.
This investigation is analogous to a
grand jury proceeding, but there are
significant differences, the import of
which is that the military procedure
affords greater rights than the grand
jury. No judge monitors grand jury
proceedings; furthermore, they are
generally secret. A prosecutor normally
guides the grand jury process; and, a
grand jury may, within its discretion,
compel the production of evidence or
the testimony of witnesses, and its
process generally is unrestrained by the
technical procedural and evidentiary
rules which govern criminal trials. Of
paramount importance is that neither
the accused nor his counsel are present
during any of the grand jury proceedings; they may not cross-examine
witnesses or submit any evidence without the express approval of the foreman
of the grand jury. The proceeding is, in
reality, an ex parte investigation.
Although the article 32 investigation
is somewhat similar to a grand jury,
there are distinguishing features which
inure to the benefit of a military
accused. The investigation provides a
discovery proceeding in which the
accused may determine the validity of
the charges before trial. 84 In order to
insure that this is not an empty gesture,
the military accused is guaranteed the
right to be present and to be represented by a qualified attorney during all
of the hearings. In addition, the accused
is granted the right to cross·examine all

witnesses against him if they are available, to present evidence in his own
behalf, and to have witnesses testify for
him. Hence, not only is there compatibility with civilian notions of justice and
fair play, the military system has gone
far beyond civilian requirements and is
perhaps paving the way in the modernization of civilian criminal proceedings.
Also, civilian standards relating to
searches and seizures and the right to a
speedy trial have been part of the
military criminal law.
The military justice system has
traveled a long and sometimes stormy
and misunderstood path. Yet, as this
brief summary demonstrates, the
civilian defendant has no rights greater
than his military counterpart. Indeed, in
many areas the protections afforded by
the code and the Manual for CourtsMartial exceed those available in civilian
criminal courts. Here, clearly, the military judicial system has kept ahead of
civilian concepts with no apparent detrimental effect upon discipline. The
opinion of Justice Pouglas in O'Callahan v. Parker 85 to the effect that
courts·martial are not independent instruments of justice but are a mechanism by which discipline is preserved and
are marked by "retributive justice,,86
indicates a woeful lack of understanding
of military criminal law today.87 Congress has held extensive hearings on the
subject of law and discipline and has
consulted with numerous authorities.
The UCMJ was enacted specifically to
meet the needs of the Armed Forces
and to guarantee to individual servicemen and women the profound American values of justice. It worked during
the Korean and Vietnamese wars.

CONCLUSION
The military criminal justice system
is a reinforcement of the military ethic.
The Congress, the courts, and the military have continually sought to keep the
UCMJ compatible with the military
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need for discipline and with the basic
rights of all American citizens guaranteed by the Constitution. The Congress
has done so through amendment, the
courts' by means of judicial interpretation, and the military by practice and
by proposed changes, such as those
which resulted in the amendments of
1968.
What is equally important is that
military personnel directly concemedcommanders, lawyers, and criminal investiqators-have continuously tried to

make the system "work." Balancing
interests has always been a difficult task
for legislators and courts alike. In the
area of military justice and discipline,
balancing of interests is a constant,
ongoing process. The search for compromise will continue successfully, so long
as both the civilian and military sectors
continue to understand that one affects
the other and that to be effective the
military ethic and its codal implementation must be acceptable to American
society.
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